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Abstract. In this paper we explore the following question: how weak can a logic be for Rosser’s
essential undecidability result to be provable for a weak arithmetical theory? It is well known that
Robinson’s Q is essentially undecidable in intuitionistic logic, and P. Hájek proved it in the fuzzy
logic BL for Grzegorczyk’s variant of Q which interprets the arithmetic operations as non-total non-
functional relations. We present a proof of essential undecidability in a much weaker substructural
logic and for a much weaker arithmetic theory, a version of Robinson’s R (with arithmetic operations
also interpreted as mere relations). Our result is based on a structural version of the undecidability
argument introduced by Kleene and we show that it goes well beyond the scope of the Boolean,
intuitionistic, or fuzzy logic.
§1. Introduction In Theorem III of Rosser (1936), it was famously established that
Peano Arithmetic was essentially undecidable (a notion only properly named later by Tarski
(1949)); that is, no consistent extension of it is decidable (see Tarski et al (1953) for the
standard reference on this topic). After Rosser’s essential undecidability theorem, it was
natural to ask for weaker theories of arithmetic that would still yield undecidability along
similar lines. Robinson (1950) provided the perhaps best known example of such a theory,
namely, Robinson’s Arithmetic Q.
The most noteworthy other essentially undecidable weakening of Q which will play a
special role here is R, also due to Robinson (see Tarski et al (1953), p. 531), which allows for
the so-called structural essential undecidability argument (to borrow the terminology from
Švejdar (2008)) due originally to Kleene (1950); see Proposition 15.9 and Theorem 15.19
of Monk (1976) for the textbook version of the argument, or below for our rendering. Below
are the standard axioms of R and Q:2
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0 This paper is an extension and generalisation of work started by Cintula and Hájek before the
unfortunate death of the latter in 2016. Hájek is included among the authors in recognition of his
work on this topic, and with the blessing of his family, but it should be noted that he was not able
to contribute directly to the final version of this paper.
1 See Visser (2014) for a survey of results involving R and Vaught (1962) for the original reference
regarding undecidability of this theory. Further noteworthy results on R are given by Jones and
Shepherdson (1983).
2 In the axiomatisation of R, ≤ is often taken to be a defined predicate, which allows for (R4) to be
simplified to just the left-to-right direction of our biconditional version. Since we shall take ≤ as
primitive, we include both directions. Note also that we use n to refer to a number, and n to refer
to the associated numeral (this will be properly defined in Section §4.).
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(R1) m + n = m + n
(R2) m · n = m · n
(R3) m , n for m , n
(R4) x ≤ n ↔ (x = 0 ∨ x = 1 ∨ · · · ∨ x = n)
(R5) x ≤ n ∨ n ≤ x
(Q1) S(x) , 0
(Q2) S(x) = S(y) → x = y
(Q3) x , 0→ (∃y)(x = S(y))
(Q4) x + 0 = x
(Q5) x + S(y) = S(x + y)
(Q6) x · 0 = 0
(Q7) x · S(y) = (x · y) + x
(Q8) x ≤ y ↔ (∃z)x + z = y
Given the proliferation of non-classical logical systems in the literature, the question
not only of potential weakenings of the arithmetic theory but also of the background
propositional logic become salient, and our aim here is to consider how much (or how
little) propositional logic suffices for something like Kleene’s argument. Our strategy will
consist in a close inspection of the structural essential undecidability argument in order to
generalise it to the non-classical case, with an eye to the question: what logical principles
are actually required for the argument to work and in which non-classical settings are they
available?
It was already well-known at least since the 1950s (see Kleene (1952)) that the undecid-
ability results for Q hold intuitionistically as well as classically. Hájek (2007) showed that
it was also true for a wide variety of fuzzy logics and an arithmetic theory called Q∽, a
variant of Q−, introduced by Grzegorczyk (2006) (see also Švejdar (2007)) which results
from Q by replacing the addition and multiplication functions by ternary predicates A and
M.
We shall show that even against the background of a weaker logic than Hájek ever
considered, we can prove essential undecidability for a cousin (in fact, a weakening against
a certain logical background) of Q∽ that we call R∽, which is a natural generalization of R.
R∽ and Q∽ are axiomatised as follows:
(R∽1) A(m, n, x) ↔ m + n = x
(R∽2) M(m, n, x) ↔ m · n = x
(R∽3) m , n for m , n
(R∽4) x ≤ n ↔ (x = 0 ∨ x = 1 ∨ · · · ∨ x = n)
(R∽5) x ≤ n ∨ n ≤ x
(R∽6) x ≤ n ∨ ¬(x ≤ n)
(Q∽0) x = y ∨ x , y
(Q∽1) S(x) , 0
(Q∽2) S(x) = S(y) → x = y
(Q∽3) x , 0→ (∃y)(x = S(y))
(Q∽4) A(x, 0, y) ↔ x = y
(Q∽5) A(x, S(y), z) ↔ (∃u)(A(x, y, u) ∧ z = S(u))
(Q∽6) M(x, 0, y) ↔ y = 0
(Q∽7a) M(x, S(y), z) → (∃u)(M(x, y, u) ∧ A(u, x, z))
(Q∽7b) M(m, n, u) → (A(u, n, x) → M(m, n + 1, x))
(Q∽8) x ≤ y ↔ (∃z)A(z, x, y)
Remark 1.1. A brief comment is in order concerning concerning these axioms. First
note that our additional axiom (R∽6) is an instance of excluded middle. We include (R∽6)
because the weaker of our two logics does not allow its derivation from the others (though
see Prop. 6.15., in which we derive it from the other R∽ axioms in our stronger logic (along
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with the assumption of excluded middle for equalities)). Furthermore, it should be noted
that adding the assumption of functionality and totality of A, M to R∽ or Q∽ results in R, Q
respectively, in classical logic. Finally, in Section §6. we comment further on the relation
of our axiomatisation Q∽ with the system studied by Hájek.
In Section §2. we present the necessary basic definitions in an abstract setting and
outline the aforementioned structural essential undecidability argument. We shall see that
the crucial ingredient of the proof is the existence of formulas separating two disjoint
recursively enumerable sets: call such a formula one which strongly separates the sets in
question. In Section §3. we present our weak logic and prove the existence of strongly
separating formulae for R∽ against the background of this logic in Section §4. (after
establishing its completeness with respect to the standard model of arithmetic for Σ1-
formulas) and finally in Section §6. we show that, in a slightly stronger logical setting
(presented in Section §5.), a variant of Hájek’s Q∽ strengthens our R∽, and thus our results
indeed generalize those of Hájek (2007).
§2. The Structural Proof of Essential Undecidability The first ingredients we need
are the formulas. As we do not yet want to bind ourselves to any particular syntax
(propositional or first order), let us only assume that we have a countable set of formulasFm
which contains a special subset of formulas that we will suggestively call the Σ1-formulas
and that for each Σ1-formula ϕ there is a special formula (not necessarily a Σ1-formula)
which we call the negation of ϕ and suggestively denote ¬ϕ.3
The second ingredient is that of a logic L which is identified with a consequence relation
⊢L over Fm, i.e., ⊢L ⊆ ℘(Fm) × Fm and for each Γ ∪ ∆ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm we have:
• Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊢L ϕ (Reflexivity)
• If Γ ⊢L ϕ and for each γ ∈ Γ we have ∆ ⊢L γ, then ∆ ⊢L ϕ (Cut)
By theory we understand simply a set of formulas; for each theory T we define the set of
its consequences in logic L as CL(T ) = {ϕ | T ⊢L ϕ}.
As the final ingredientwe need to define the notion of essential undecidability of a theory.
As the underlying logic can vary, we have to be a bit more careful and formalistic in our
definitions of (un)decidability, extension and consistency now (so that we can be a bit looser
going forward).4 When we speak about the decidability of a theory T , we actually speak
about the decidability of the setCL(T ), i.e., questions of decidability depends on the logic in
question (e.g. all theories are trivially decidable in the inconsistent logic Inc = ℘(Fm)×Fm).
Analogously when we say that a theory T strengthens a theory S we do not speak about
3 Note that ¬ϕ need not be a formula per se, it is merely a notation of the negation of ϕ. The
argument below would work perfectly well if all formulas would be Σ1-formulas; we however in
principle assume it can be a proper subset to cover a wider logical setting. See mainly our notion
of consistency below.
4 The abstract framework we develop here can be seen as a still less general version of a
similar framework developed by Smullyan (1961) for abstract reasoning about undecidability
and incompleteness. We could use his framework of representation systems in order to present
our results by fixing for one of our arithmetic theories U, a representation where S is the set of
Σ1-formulae in the language of U, T = CL(U), and R = {ϕ | U ⊢L ¬ϕ}. This would put our
work into Smullyan’s context, but we follow our current mode of presentation here because we do
not need the additional generality provided by Smullyan’s approach here. Thanks are due to an
anonymous referee for pointing out this connection.
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simple subsethood but about the fact that T proves all axioms of S in L, i.e., S ⊆ CL(T ).
Finally the consistency depends on the logic in question and on the class of Σ1-formulas:
we say that a theory T is Σ1-consistent in L if for no Σ1-formula ϕ we have T ⊢L ϕ and
T ⊢L ¬ϕ (note the our notion of consistency implies non-triviality, i.e., that there is a ϕ
such that T 0L ϕ, and in sufficiently strong logics the converse is true as well; furthermore
in a sufficiently strong arithmetical theory it is equivalent with T 0L 0 = 1).
Therefore we should speak about Σ1-consistency, decidability, and strengthening in L.
To simplify matters, whenever the logic is known from the context we assume that all
subsequent uses of these three notions are parameterized by the logic in question. We also
omit the prefix Σ1, when this is clear from the context. With this convention in place, we
can give the following definition analogously to the classical case:
Definition 2.2. A theory T is essentially undecidable in L if it is consistent and each
consistent theory strengthening T is undecidable.
The next proposition shows that our notion of essential undecidability is a particularly
robust version of essential undecidability as it is preserved not only in stronger theories
but also in stronger logics. The statement of this proposition is made somewhat intricate
to accommodate for the possibility of a stronger logic being defined over a bigger set of
formulas.
Proposition 2.3. Let L be a logic over a set of formulas Fm and L′ ⊇ L a logic over
a set of formulas Fm′ ⊇ Fm such that all Σ1-formulas of Fm are Σ1-formulas of Fm
′.
Furthermore, assume that T is an essentially undecidable theory in L. Then any theory S
of L′ which is consistent and strengthensT (seen as a L′-theory) is essentially undecidable
in L′.
Proof. It suffices to show that any theory U which is consistent in L′ and strengthens S in
L
′ is undecidable in L′. Define a set V = {χ ∈ Fm | U ⊢L′ χ} and observe V = CL(V):
indeed if V ⊢L δ implies V ⊢L′ δ and for each χ ∈ V we have U ⊢L′ χ and so due to the
(cut) rule of L′ we have U ⊢L′ δ, i.e., δ ∈ V .
Therefore V is consistent in L (otherwise we would obtain contradiction with the
assumption that U is consistent in L′) and strengthens T in L (actually T ⊆ U) and so
by essential undecidability of T in L we know that V is undecidable. Since χ ∈ V iff
χ ∈ CL′(U), then CL′(U) is undecidable as well. 
Whenwe establish that a theoryT of a logicL is a Rosser theory, defined below, the proof
of the essential undecidability theorem can proceed as in the classical setting. We present
the proof in some detail so it is obvious that no additional properties of L are needed.
Definition 2.4. (Rosser Theories) We say that a theory T is Rosser in logic L if for
each pair of disjoint recursively enumerable sets A, B ⊆ N there is a recursive series of
Σ1-formulas ϕn which strongly separate A from B, that is:
• n ∈ A implies T ⊢L ϕn.
• n ∈ B implies T ⊢L ¬ϕn .
Theorem 2.5. (Rosser Theorem) Let L be a logic and T an L-consistent Rosser theory.
Then T is essentially undecidable in L.
Proof. First recall that from recursion theory (see e.g. Theorem 6.24 of Monk (1976)) that
we know that there are disjoint r.e. sets A, B ⊆ N such that each X ⊇ A such that X ∩ B = ∅
is not recursive. Let ϕn be the series of Σ1-formulas guaranteed strongly separating A and
B.
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Consider a consistent theory S strengtheningT , define X = {n | S ⊢ ϕn}, and notice that:
• n ∈ A implies T ⊢L ϕn and so, due to the (cut) rule, S ⊢ ϕn, which entails X ⊇ A.
• n ∈ B implies T ⊢L ¬ϕn and so S ⊢ ¬ϕn, which entails X ∩ B = ∅ (otherwise S
would not be consistent).
Thus X cannot be recursive and as it is clearly recursively reducible to CL(S), S cannot be
decidable in L. 
This structural argument leaves open the question of which logical principles are needed
to prove that some theory T is Rosser in L, which is where our work really begins.
§3. A weaker logic The minimal logic in which we prove that R∽ is Rosser will be
defined as a natural first-order extension of a particular propositional non-classical logic.
We take propositional logics to be substitution-invariant consequence relations over a set
of propositional formulas given by a propositional language L (a set of connectives with
arities). It is well-known that each such logic can be presented by means of a Hilbert style
proof system consisting of axiom and rule schemata (we use the ⊲ symbol to separate
premises of a rule from its conclusion).
Our basic propositional language L0 consists of three binary connectives (implication
→, (lattice) conjunction ∧ and (lattice) disjunction ∨) and a propositional constant ⊥.5
Negation ¬ and equivalence↔ are defined in the following standard way:
¬ϕ := ϕ→ ⊥ ϕ↔ ψ := (ϕ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ).
As usual, we assume that ¬ has the highest binding power, followed by ∧ and ∨, and
finally→ and↔ have the lowest. Our basic propositional logic in the language L0, which
we denote as L0, is given by the following Hilbert style proof system:6
(identity) ϕ→ ϕ (weakening) ϕ ⊲ ψ → ϕ
(∧elim) ϕ ∧ ψ → ϕ (MP) ϕ, ϕ→ ψ ⊲ ψ
(∧elim) ϕ ∧ ψ → ψ (assertion) ϕ ⊲ (ϕ→ ψ) → ψ
(∨intro) ϕ→ ϕ ∨ ψ (trans) ϕ→ ψ, ψ → χ ⊲ ϕ→ χ
(∨intro) ψ → ϕ ∨ ψ (morg) ¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ ⊲ ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ)
(∧intro) χ → ϕ, χ → ψ ⊲ χ → ϕ ∧ ψ
(∨elim) ϕ→ χ, ψ → χ ⊲ ϕ ∨ ψ → χ
The following theorems and derived rules are easily shown to be derivable in L0:7
(assoc) ϕ ∨ (ψ ∨ χ) ↔ (ϕ ∨ ψ) ∨ χ
(adj) ϕ, ψ ⊲ ϕ ∧ ψ
(dni) ϕ ⊲ ¬¬ϕ
5 Note that in our weaker logic (axiomatised below) we do not include the axiom ⊥ → ϕ, so though
we use this suggestive notation, for now ⊥ is merely a propositional constant (however later in
Section §5., we will will work with the logic SLw obeying this additional axiom, in which it will
become a genuine falsum constant).
6 Note the we use the same symbol for two closely related yet different axioms, we can afford this
slight abuse of language as in any given formal proof it it will be clear which of them we are using.
We use the same convention for some other upcoming axiom/theorems/rules.
7 Associativity is a simple consequence of (∨intro), (∨elim) and (trans); adjunction follows using
(weakening) for ψ being any theorem and (∧intro) together with (MP); and finally (dni) is an
instance of (assertion).
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Remark 3.6. L0 extends lattice logic by the rules (morg), (weakening), and (assertion).
These additional rules are chosen to fulfill specific tasks in fleshing out the structural
argument for our version of R∽. So if L0 looks somewhat artificial, that’s because it is.
However, it should be noted that it is a sublogic of many well known systems, most notably
classical and intuitionistic logic, as well as Hájek’s BL and (related to the stronger system
we’ll present later in Section §5.) the non-distributive, non-associative Lambek calculus
with weakening in L0, when this is presented with (assertion) as a rule (related systems to
this are discussed, for instance, in Galatos et al (2007)). In fact, it is easy to see that L0 is
a proper sublogic of all these logics.
Now we are ready to introduce first-order logics. We present only the syntactical aspects,
excepting where we consider a very special model (namely, the natural numbers with a
classical interpretation of the vocabulary). Let us fix a propositional logic L expanding
L0 (thus in particular, L has a propositional language which contains L0). Our notion of
first-order language is standard, i.e., it is given by a set of function and predicate symbols
with a special binary predicate symbol = for equality (we write t , s for ¬(t = s)). Then
terms; atomic formulas, and formulas are built up as usual. In addition, the notions of
free/bounded variable, substitutability, sentence, etc. are defined as usual.
The first-order logic QL, for a given predicate language, is axiomatised by the substi-
tutional instances of all axioms/rules of L (i.e., formulas resulting by replacing atoms by
first-order formulas) and the following additional axiom/rule schemata (we assume that t
substitutable for x in ϕ and x not free in χ):
(∀ins) (∀x)ϕ(x) → ϕ(t)
(∃intro) ϕ(t) → (∃x)ϕ(x)
(∀intro) χ → ψ ⊲ χ → (∀x)ψ
(∃elim) ψ → χ ⊲ (∃x)ψ → χ
(id) x = x
(com) x = y → y = x
(trans) x = y → (y = z → x = z)
(=prin) x = y → t(x) = t(y)
(=prin) x = y → (ϕ(x) → ϕ(y))
We can easily establish the following auxiliary derived rules:8
(aux) ϕ(t) ⊲ x = t → ϕ(x)
(gen) ϕ ⊲ (∀x)ϕ
§4. Main result In order to apply the structural argument presented in Section §2. we
need to fix a logic over a set of formulas, identify the Σ1-formulas, define a theory, show
that it is consistent and Rosser.
We will work with the logic QL0 over the set of formulas for the predicate language
of Grzegorczyk’s arithmetic, i.e., the language with constant 0, unary function symbol S,
binary predicate symbols = and ≤, and ternary predicate symbols A and M. We define the
nth numeral n as usual: n = S n. . . S(0).
8 To derive (aux), assuming ϕ(t), use (assertion) to obtain (ϕ(t) → ϕ(x)) → ϕ(x) and so (=prin)
and (trans) complete the proof.
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Σ1-formulas be those of the form ϕ = (∃x)ψ for some ∆0-formula ψ, where ∆0-formulas
are those arithmetical formulas where all quantifiers are bounded, i.e., are of the form:9
(∀x ≤ y)ϕ = (∀x)(¬(x ≤ y) ∨ ϕ)
(∃x ≤ y)ϕ = (∃x)(x ≤ y ∧ ϕ)
As expected the negation of a Σ1-formula ϕ will be the formula ¬ϕ. Now we can formally
present the theory R∽ which we mentioned in the introduction:10
(R∽1) A(m, n, x) ↔ m + n = x for any n and m
(R∽2) M(m, n, x) ↔ m · n = x for any n and m
(R∽3) m , n for m , n
(R∽4) x ≤ n ↔ (x = 0 ∨ x = 1 ∨ · · · ∨ x = n) for any n
(R∽5) x ≤ n ∨ n ≤ x for any n
(R∽6) x ≤ n ∨ ¬(x ≤ n) for any n
Our goal in this section is to establish essential undecidability of R∽ in QL0. Thanks to
Theorem 2.5. we know that it suffices to prove that it is QL0-consistent and Rosser.
By N we denote the set of natural numbers and byN we denote the standard model of the
natural numbers in our arithmetical language, i.e., the structure with constant 0 interpreted
as 0, S interpreted so that S(k) = k +1, ≤ interpreted by the usual order of natural numbers,
and A and M as:
AN(k, l,m) iff k + l = m
MN(k, l,m) iff k · l = m.
In this model we can interpret all connectives and quantifiers of QL0 in a fully classical
way (so, for instance, ϕ→ ψ should be interpreted as ¬ϕ∨ψ for Boolean ¬). For a formula
ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) with free variables x1, . . . , xn, we write:
• N |= ϕ(k1, . . . , kn) if ϕ is satisfied in N when variables xi are evaluated as ki
• N |= ϕ if N |= ϕ(k1, . . . , kn) for each k1, . . . , kn ∈ N .
Note that a numeral n is interpreted inN as the numbern and sowe haveN |= ϕ(k1, . . . , kn)
iff N |= ϕ(k1, . . . , kn).
It is easy to see that the structureN can be interpreted as a model of R∽ in QL0; formally
speaking we can prove the following (as in the rest of this section we work in the logic QL0
only, we omit it as a subscript of ⊢):
Proposition 4.7. (Soundness) For each formula ϕ, R∽ ⊢ ϕ implies N |= ϕ.
For no Σ1-formula ϕ do we have N |= ϕ and N |= ¬ϕ, and this entails that R∽ is QL0-
consistent. As the next step we establish the converse claim for Σ1-sentences (known as
Σ1-completeness), i.e., for each Σ1-sentence ϕ we have N |= ϕ only if R∽ ⊢ ϕ. We prove a
stronger statement.
9 Let us stress that this definition of bounded quantification is intended for the classical arithmetical
formulas; the bounded quantifiers in non-classical logics may be (and often are) defined using
implication and strong conjunction; but as we have no need for such quantifiers in the paper, no
confusion should arise.
10 Note that because of (assoc), we may state (R∽4) with no fixed association.
ZU064-05-FPR Final 23 June 2020 1:28
8 Badia, Cintula, Hájek, and Tedder
Theorem 4.8. ( Σ1-completeness) For each Σ1-formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xn), we have:
N |= ϕ(k1, . . . , kn) iff R
∽ ⊢ ϕ(k1, . . . , kn).
Proof. One direction is a consequence of Proposition 4.7.and the fact thatN |= ϕ(k1, . . . , kn)
iff N |= ϕ(k1, . . . , kn). We prove the converse direction first for ∆0-formulas by induction
on the complexity of ϕ. As we cannot deal with negation directly, the induction step for it
will have to take care of the next principal connective/quantifier.
• ϕ is atomic First note that all terms are of the form S . . . S(x) for some variable x, so it
suffices to prove the claim for numerals. Observe that (1) if N |= n = m, then R∽ ⊢ n = m
by (=prin); (2) if N |= A(n,m, k) (i.e., n + m = k), then as before R∽ ⊢ n + m = k
which due to (R∽1) implies R∽ ⊢ A(n,m, k); (3) analogously N |= M(n,m, k) implies
R∽ ⊢ M(n,m, k) using (R∽2); and finally (4) fromN |= m ≤ n, we know that R∽ ⊢ m ≤ n
thanks to axiom (R∽4) for x = m (as then m = m is one of the disjoints on the right-hand
side disjunction).
• ϕ = ψ ∧ χ From the assumption we obtain N |= ψ and N |= χ. Thus by the induction
assumption R∽ ⊢ ψ and R∽ ⊢ χ, and so (adj) completes the proof.
• ϕ = ψ ∨ χ From the assumption we obtain N |= ψ or N |= χ. Thus by the induction
assumption R∽ ⊢ ψ or R∽ ⊢ χ, and so (∨intro) completes the proof.
• ϕ = (∃y ≤ x)ψ(y, x1, . . . , xn) FromN |= (∃y ≤ k)ψ(y, k1, . . . , kn)we obtain an m such
that
N |= m ≤ k and N |= ψ(m, k1, . . . , kn).
Thus by the induction assumption R∽ ⊢ m ≤ k and R∽ ⊢ ψ(m, k1, . . . , kn) and so (adj)
and (∃intro) complete the proof.
• ϕ = (∀y ≤ x)ψ(y, x1, . . . , xn) From N |= (∀y ≤ k)ψ(y, k1, . . . , kn) we know that for
each m ≤ k we have N |= ψ(m, k1, . . . , kn). Thus by the induction assumption we obtain,
R∽ ⊢ ψ(m, k1, . . . , kn).
Next we use (aux) to obtain, for m ≤ k:
R∽ ⊢ y = m → ψ(y, k1, . . . , kn).
Thus, using (∨elim), we obtain
R∽ ⊢ (y = 0 ∨ y = 1 ∨ · · · ∨ y = k) → ψ(y, k1, . . . , kn)
which, using (R∽4), (∨intro), and (trans), entails:
R∽ ⊢ (y ≤ k) → ¬(y ≤ k) ∨ ψ(y, k1, . . . , kn).
As clearly using (∨intro) we also have
R∽ ⊢ ¬(y ≤ k) → ¬(y ≤ k) ∨ ψ(y, k1, . . . , kn).
then by (∨elim) and axiom (R∽6),
R∽ ⊢ ¬(y ≤ k) ∨ ψ(y, k1, . . . , kn).
and (gen) complete the proof.
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• ϕ = ¬ψ We have to distinguish the structure of ψ:
− ψ is atomic Analogously to the positive case: (1) IfN |= n , m, then R∽ ⊢ ¬(n = m)
by (R∽3); (2) ifN |= ¬A(n,m, k) (i.e., n+m , k), then as before R∽ ⊢ n + m , k which
due to (R∽1) and (trans) implies R∽ ⊢ ¬A(n,m, k); (3) analogously N |= ¬M(n,m, k)
implies R∽ ⊢ ¬M(n,m, k) using (R∽2); and finally (4) from N |= ¬(m ≤ n), implies
for each k ≤ n we have k , m, thus by (R∽3) we obtain
R∽ ⊢ m = k → ⊥.
Thus by (∨elim) we obtain
R∽ ⊢ m = 0 ∨ m = 1 · · · ∨ m = n → ⊥
and so (R∽4) and and (trans) complete the proof.
− ψ = α ∧ β FromN |= ¬(α∧β)we obtainN |= ¬α orN |= ¬β. Thus by the induction
assumption we know that R∽ ⊢ α → ⊥ or R∽ ⊢ β → ⊥ and so in both cases (∧elim)
and (trans) completes the proof.
− ψ = α ∨ β From N |= ¬(α ∨ β) we obtain N |= ¬α and N |= ¬β. Thus by the
induction assumption we know that R∽ ⊢ α → ⊥ and R∽ ⊢ β → ⊥ and so (∨elim)
completes the proof.
− ψ = ¬χ From N |= ¬¬χ we obtain N |= χ. Thus by the induction assumption we
know that R∽ ⊢ χ and so (dni) completes the proof.
− ψ = (∃y ≤ x)χ(y, x1, . . . , xn) From N |= ¬(∃y ≤ k)χ(y, k1, . . . , kn) we obtain for
each m ≤ k that: N |= ¬χ(m, k1, . . . , kn) . Thus as in the the positive case for ∀ we
could show that
R∽ ⊢ ¬(y ≤ k) ∨ ¬χ(y, k1, . . . , kn).
Thus by (morg) we obtain
R∽ ⊢ y ≤ k ∧ χ(y, k1, . . . , kn) → ⊥
and so (∃elim) completes the proof.
− ψ = (∀y ≤ x)χ(y, x1, . . . , xn) From N |= ¬(∀y ≤ k)χ(y, k1, . . . , kn) we know that
there is an m such that
N |= ¬¬(m ≤ k) and N |= ¬χ(m, k1, . . . , kn).
Thus by the induction assumption we obtain
R∽ ⊢ ¬(m ≤ k) → ⊥ and R∽ ⊢ χ(m, k1, . . . , kn) → ⊥
which using (∨elim) entails
R∽ ⊢ (¬(m ≤ k) ∨ χ(m, k1, . . . , kn)) → ⊥
and so (∀ins) and (trans) complete the proof.
Finally we deal with Σ1-formulas. Assume thatN |= (∃y)ψ for some ∆0-formulaψ. Then
there is some m such that N |= ψ(m, k1, . . . , kn). Hence, R∽ ⊢ ψ(m, k1, . . . , kn) and so
(∃intro) completes the proof. 
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Now we have all the ingredients to prove that R∽ is Rosser inQL0; we will actually show
a bit more: there is a single Σ1-formula ϕ such that ϕ(0), ϕ(1), . . . is the series of formulas
witnessing that R∽ is Rosser.11
Lemma 4.9. For each pair of disjoint r.e. sets A, B ⊆ N, there is a Σ1-formula ϕ(x) such
that
n ∈ A implies R∽ ⊢ ϕ(n)
n ∈ B implies R∽ ⊢ ¬ϕ(n)
Proof. From the recursion theory (see e.g. Lindström (1997), Fact 1.3(b)) we know that
A and B are definable using the classical Σ1-formulas, i.e., formulas in the language with
functions + and · instead of predicates A and M. Let us show that each ‘classical’ ∆0-
formula is equivalent to a ∆0-formula in our language (assuming that N interprets all these
symbols).
Let us call the terms and formulas of our language simple. An classical atomic formula
is almost-simple if it is simple or of the form x = t1 ◦ t2, where ◦ is either + or ·, x is a
variable and t1 and t2 are simple term. Clearly replacing such a formula by A(t1, t2, z) or
M(t1, t2, x) respectively yields an equivalent formula in our language. So it suffices to show
that any ‘classical’ ∆0-formula is equivalent to a ‘classical’ ∆0-formula where all atomic
formulas are simple or almost-simple (we omit the adjective ‘classical’ from now on). First,
we observe the validity of the following three statements of classical logic for ◦ being each
+ or ·, terms t, t1, t2 and variables x, x1, x2 not occurring in those terms:
• N |= t = t1 ◦ t2 ↔ (∃x1 ≤ t)(∃x2 ≤ t)(t = x1 ◦ x2)
• N |= t1 ◦ t2 ≤ t ↔ (∃x1 ≤ t)(∃x2 ≤ t)(x1 ◦ x2 ≤ t)
• N |= t ≤ t1 ◦ t2 ↔ (∃x1 ≤ t)(∃x2 ≤ t)(x1 ≤ t1 ∧ x2 ≤ t2 ∧ t = x1 ◦ x2).
Next we note that applying any of these equivalencies to any non-almost-simple atomic
subformula of a given ∆0-formula χ strictly decreases the finite multiset of depths of terms
occurring in the formula according to the standard multiset well-ordering.12 Therefore
exhaustively applying these equivalencies yields the required equivalent ∆0-formula with
only almost-simple atomic formulas.
Thus we can assume that there are ∆0-formulas α(x, v) and β(x, v) (in our language) such
that
• n ∈ A iff N |= (∃v)α(n, v).
• n ∈ B iff N |= (∃v)β(n, v).
We define the ∆0-formula ψ(x):
ψ(x, v) = ¬(¬α(x, v) ∨ (∃u ≤ v)β(x, u))
and show that the Σ1-formula ϕ(x) = (∃v)ψ(x, v) has the desired properties.
11 The version of the following lemma concerning extensions of R over classical logic was established
by Putnam and Smullyan (1960).
12 A finite multiset over a set S is an ordered pair 〈S, f 〉, where f is a function f : S → N and
{x ∈ S | f (x) > 0} is finite. If ≤ is a well-ordering of S, then:
〈S, f 〉 ≤m 〈S, g〉 :⇐⇒ ∀x ∈ S
(
f (x) > g(x) =⇒ ∃y ∈ S
(
y > x and g(y) > f (y)
) )
is a well-ordering on the set of all finite multisets over S, known as the Dershowitz–Manna
ordering, for which see Dershowitz and Manna (1979).
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The first case (n ∈ A) is easy: observe that this entails that n < B and so we have not only
N |= α(n,m) for somem but also thatN |= ¬β(n, k) for each k and soN |= ¬(∃u ≤ m)β(n, u).
Therefore N |= ϕ(n) and so by Theorem 4.8. it follows that R∽ ⊢ ϕ(n).
The proof of the second case (n ∈ B) is not so direct because ¬ϕ is not a Σ1-formula and
so we cannot use Σ1-completeness directly. However, because we know that N |= β(n,m)
for some m and that N |= ¬α(n, k) for each k we can use it to obtain R∽ ⊢ β(n,m) and
R∽ ⊢ ¬α(n, k). Using these facts we prove that
R∽ ⊢ v ≤ m → ¬α(n, v) (1)
R∽ ⊢ m ≤ v → (∃u ≤ v)β(n, u). (2)
and after establishing these two claims the proof that R∽ ⊢ ¬ϕ(n) easily follows: indeed
using them together with (∨intro), (∨elim), and (R∽5) we obtain
R∽ ⊢ ¬α(n, v) ∨ (∃u ≤ v)β(n, u)
and so using (dni) we get R∽ ⊢ ψ(x, v) → ⊥ and so (∃elim) completes the proof.
To prove (1) we start with R∽ ⊢ ¬α(n, k) and (aux) to obtain for any k ≤ m:
R∽ ⊢ v = k → ¬α(n, v)
Therefore the proof is done thanks to (∨elim) and (R∽4).
To prove (2) we use the claim R∽ ⊢ β(n,m) together with (weakening), (identity), and
(∨intro) to obtain:
R∽ ⊢ m ≤ v → m ≤ v ∧ β(n,m)
and so (∃intro) completes the proof. 
All that is left is to apply Theorem 2.5. and Proposition 2.3. to obtain the following
results.
Theorem 4.10. The theory R∽ is essentially undecidable in QL0.
Corollary 4.11. Let L be a propositional logic expanding L0, L a predicate logic
expandingQL, andT a theory strengthening R∽ in L. If T is L-consistent (i.e. proves ϕ and
¬ϕ for no Σ1-formula ϕ), then it is essentially undecidable in L.
§5. A stronger logic Our stronger propositional logic in the propositional language
L0, which we denote as SLw—short for “the L0-fragment of the non-associative Lambek
calculuswith left and rightweakening”—is given by the followingHilbert style proof system
(note here that SLw , unlike L0, is not paraconsistent as we include the axiom (⊥elim)):
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(identity) ϕ→ ϕ
(∧elim) (ϕ ∧ ψ) → ϕ
(∧elim) (ϕ ∧ ψ) → ψ
(∧intro) ((ϕ→ ψ) ∧ (ϕ→ χ)) → (ϕ→ ψ ∧ χ)
(∨intro) ϕ→ (ϕ ∨ ψ)
(∨intro) ψ → (ϕ ∨ ψ)
(∨elim) (ϕ→ χ) ∧ (ψ → χ) → (ϕ ∨ ψ → χ)
(weakening) ϕ→ (ψ → ϕ)
(⊥elim) ⊥ → ϕ
(MP) ϕ, ϕ→ ψ ⊲ ψ
(adj) ϕ, ψ ⊲ ϕ ∧ ψ
(tone→) ϕ→ ψ, χ → θ ⊲ (ψ → χ) → (ϕ→ θ)
(assertion) ϕ ⊲ (ϕ→ ψ) → ψ
Let us first observe that SLw indeed extendsL0: the latter’s rules of (weakening), (∧intro),
and (∨elim) follow from the corresponding axioms of SLw using the rules (MP) and (adj);
(trans) follows from (tone→) by taking ψ = χ using (identity) and (MP); and the rule
(morg) follows from the axiomatic form stated below.
Let us note that the rule (tone→) can be equivalently replaced by the following two
rules:13
(suffixing) ϕ→ ψ ⊲ (ψ → χ) → (ϕ→ χ)
(prefixing) ϕ→ ψ ⊲ (χ → ϕ) → (χ → ψ)
The following theorems/rules are derivable in L0:14
(cont) ϕ→ ψ ⊲ ¬ψ → ¬ϕ.
(morg) ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ) ↔ ¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ
(morg) ¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ → ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ)
(weakening) ϕ→ (ψ → ϕ ∧ ψ)
(red) ¬ϕ→ (ϕ→ χ)
(exp) ϕ ∧ ψ → χ ⊲ ϕ→ (ψ → χ)
Remark 5.12. SLw can be seen as a fragment of the non-associative Lambek calculus
with left and right weakening (in the terminology of Galatos et al (2007) (⊥elim) is left
weakening and our (weakening) is their right weakening). It is indeed just a fragment:
the language of the full logic SLw also involves fusion (residuated conjunction) and dual
implication and it is well known that they are not definable from our connectives. The non-
associativity of SLw refers to the residuated conjunction, but this fact can be expressed,
using implication and their statement of residuation, as the failure of formula (ϕ→ ψ) →
((ψ → χ) → (ϕ→ χ)). Therefore SLw is strictly weaker than Hájek’s logic BL.
SLw can be seen as the extension of the positive fragment (without distribution) of the
basic relevant logic B, studied, for instance, by Routley et al (1982), by the weakening
axiom, the assertion rule, and negation defined in terms of ⊥.
13 For one direction juts consider suitable instances of (tone→) and the axiom (identity); for converse
direction first use (prefixing) to obtain χ → θ ⊲ (ψ → χ) → (ψ → θ) and then (suffixing) to
obtain ϕ→ ψ ⊲ (ψ → θ) → (ϕ→ θ) and the rule (trans) completes the proof.
14 The first rule is a direct consequence of (suffixing); both (morg)s are consequences of (∧intro),
(∧elim), (∨intro), (∨elim), and (cont); the stronger form of (weakening) follows from applying
(∧intro) twice on ϕ → (ψ → ψ) and ϕ → (ψ → ϕ); (red) follows from applying (prefixing) on
(⊥elim); and finally to obtain (exp) apply (prefixing) twice on ϕ ∧ ψ → χ and use (weakening).
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Finally we need to prove two important facts about crisp formulae, i.e. formulaeψ where
ψ ∨ ¬ψ is provable. The first claim can be seen as converse of the derived rule (exp).
Proposition 5.13. Assume that formula ϕ is crisp in T and T ⊢ ϕ → (ψ → χ). Then
also T ⊢ ϕ ∧ ψ → χ. If furthermore ψ is also a crisp formula in T , then the formula ϕ ∨ ψ
is crisp in T as well.
Proof. We present formal derivations of both claims
• (1) (ψ → χ) → (ϕ ∧ ψ → χ) (∧elim) and (suffixing)
(2) (ϕ→ χ) → (ϕ ∧ ψ → χ) (∧elim) and (suffixing)
(3) ϕ→ (ϕ ∧ ψ → χ) ϕ→ (ψ → χ), (1), and (trans)
(4) ¬ϕ→ (ϕ ∧ ψ → χ) (red), (2), and (trans)
(5) ϕ ∧ ψ → χ (3), (4), (∨elim) and crispness of ϕ.
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• Let us denote the formula (ϕ ∨ ψ) ∨ ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ) as χ
(1) ϕ→ χ (∨intro)
(2) ψ → χ (∨intro)
(3) ¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ → χ (morg), (∨intro), and (trans)
(4) ¬ϕ→ (¬ψ → χ) (3) and (exp)
(5) ϕ→ (¬ψ → χ) (1), (weakening), and (trans)
(6) ¬ψ → χ (4), (5), (∨elim), and crispness of ϕ
(7) χ (2), (6), (∨elim), and crispness of ψ

§6. Q∽ strengthens R∽ in QSLw In this section we prove that the arithmetical theory
Q∽ proves all theorems of R∽ against the background of QSLw . As a reminder, Q
∽ stands
to Q as R∽ stands to R and is axiomatised as follows:
(Q∽0) x = y ∨ x , y
(Q∽1) S(x) , 0
(Q∽2) S(x) = S(y) → x = y
(Q∽3) x , 0→ (∃y)(x = S(y))
(Q∽4) A(x, 0, y) ↔ x = y
(Q∽5) A(x, S(y), z) ↔ (∃u)(A(x, y, u) ∧ z = S(u))
(Q∽6) M(x, 0, y) ↔ y = 0
(Q∽7a) M(x, S(y), z) → (∃u)(M(x, y, u) ∧ A(u, x, z))
(Q∽7b) M(m, n, u) → (A(u, n, x) → M(m, n + 1, x))
(Q∽8) x ≤ y ↔ (∃z)A(z, x, y)
Remark 6.14. It is noteworthy that our Q∽ differs slightly from Hájek’s. There are two
ways in which this is the case. First, we include the additional axiom (Q∽0) stating that
identities are crisp. Hájek includes this as an assumption of the first order logic, whereas
we build it directly into the theory.
In addition, his system includes only one axiom (Q∽7)—the biconditional version of
our (Q∽7a)—and furthermore in his (Q∽5) and (Q∽7), the conjunction occurring is the
strong conjunction of BL (that of which the conditional is residual). Note that all of our Q∽
axioms are provable from Hájek’s version of the theory in BL. First, (Q∽7a) and (Q∽7b)
are consequences of his version stated with strong conjunction. In addition, one can prove
our (Q∽5) from his arithmetic theory in BL. First, since ϕ → (ψ → ϕ ∧ ψ) is provable in
both our systems, our left-to-right direction of (Q∽5) is an immediate consequence of his
(this is the same reason as that for why our (Q∽7a) is a consequence of his axiom). Second,
(∃u)(A(x, y, u) ∧ z = S(u)) → A(x, S(y), z) is provable in his system given the crispness of
identity, as he shows that in first order BL (which is actually strictly stronger then QBL
by using the additional axiom of constants domains), whenever ϕ is crisp, then any weak
conjunction of ϕ with some other formula is equivalent to their strong conjunction; see
Hájek (2007), remark 2.1(1). So, since z = S(u) is crisp, the result follows.
Hence, our results do indeed generalise Hájek’s, despite our using a variant on his Q∽.
Note that inQ∽ , thanks to (Q∽0), Prop 5.13., and (exp), we can replace the identity axiom
(=prin) for formulas by its equivalent formulation:
(=prin) x = y ∧ ϕ(x) → ϕ(y)
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Theorem 6.15. Q∽ strengthens R∽ in QSLw .
Proof. Before we start proving the axioms of R∽ let us prove two useful preliminaries:
Claim 1 Q∽ ⊢ x ≤ y ↔ S(x) ≤ S(y)).
Claim 2 For any formula ϕ(x) such that Q∽ ⊢ ϕ(0) and Q∽ ⊢ ϕ(S(y)) we have Q∽ ⊢ ϕ(x).
To prove the first claim it clearly suffices to prove A(x, y, z) ↔ A(x, S(y), S(z)) and
use (∃intro), (∃elim) and (Q∽8) to complete the proof. The proof of the left-to-right
implication is easy: clearly A(x, y, z) → A(x, y, z) ∧ S(z) = S(z). Thus, by (∃intro) and
(trans), A(x, y, z) → (∃u)(A(x, y, u) ∧ S(z) = S(u)) and so (Q∽5) completes the proof. The
converse implication is a bit more complex:
(1) S(z) = S(u) → z = u (Q∽2)
(2) A(x, y, u) ∧ S(z) = S(u) → A(x, y, u) ∧ z = u (1), (∧intro), (∧elim)
(3) A(x, y, u) ∧ S(z) = S(u) → A(x, y, z) (2), (=prin), and (trans)
(4) (∃u)(A(x, y, u) ∧ S(z) = S(u)) → A(x, y, z) (3) and (∃elim)
(5) A(x, S(y), S(z)) → A(x, y, z) (Q∽5), (4), (trans)
To prove the second claim let us use (aux) for both premises to obtainQ∽ ⊢ x = 0→ ϕ(0)
and Q∽ ⊢ x = S(y) → ϕ(x). Using (∃elim) and (Q∽3) we obtain Q∽ ⊢ x , 0 → ϕ(x) and
thus (∨elim) and (Q∽0) complete the proof.
(R∽1): First we prove A(m, n, x) → x = m + n by metainduction on n. The case n = 0
follows from (Q∽4). The inductive case:
(1) A(m, n, u) → u = m + n by IH
(2) A(m, n, u) ∧ x = S(u) → u = m + n ∧ x = S(u) (1), (∧intro), (∧elim)
(3) A(m, n, u) ∧ x = S(u) → x = m + n + 1 (2), (=prin), (trans)
(4) (∃u)(A(m, n, u) ∧ x = S(u)) → x = m + n + 1 (3), (∃elim)
(5) A(m, n + 1, u) → x = m + n + 1 (4), (Q∽5), (trans)
To prove the converse directionwe show, again bymetainduction on n, that A(m, n,m + n)
and use (aux) to complete the proof. Again, the case n = 0 follows from (Q∽4) and
the inductive case follows immediately from the induction assumption and the fact that
A(x, y, z) ↔ A(x, S(y), S(z)) which we established in the proof of Claim 1.
(R∽2): The proof is similar; first establish M(m, n, x) → x = m · n by metainduction on
n. The case n = 0 follows from (Q∽6). The inductive case:
(1) M(m, n, u) → u = m · n by IH
(2) M(m, n, u) ∧ A(u,m, x) → u = m · n ∧ A(u,m, x) (1), (∧intro), (∧elim)
(3) M(m, n, u) ∧ A(u,m, x) → A(m · n,m, x) (2), (=prin), (trans)
(4) M(m, n, u) ∧ A(u,m, x) → x = m · (n + 1) (3), (R∽1), (trans)
(5) (∃u)(M(m, n, u) ∧ A(u,m, x)) → x = m · (n + 1) (4), (∃elim)
(6) M(m, n + 1, u) → x = m · (n + 1) (5), (Q∽7a), (trans)
To prove the converse directionwe show, again bymetainduction on n, that M(m, n,m · n)
and then (aux) completes the proof.Again, the case n = 0 follows from (Q∽6). The inductive
case:
(1) M(m, n,m · n) IH
(2) A(m · n, n,m · (n + 1)) (R∽1)
(3) M(m, n,m · n) → (A(m · n, n,m · (n + 1)) → M(m, n + 1,m · (n + 1))) (Q∽7b)
(4) M(m, n + 1,m · (n + 1)) (3) and MP twice
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(R∽3): It suffices to establish the case where n < m. Observe that m = n → m − n = 0
by repeated use of (Q∽2). As m − n , 0 we know that m = n → S(m − n − 1) = 0 and as
S(m − n − 1) = 0→ ⊥ due to (Q∽1), the claim follows.
(R∽4): To prove the right-to-left direction observe that for k ≤ n we have A(n − k, k, n)
due to (R∽1) and so k ≤ n using (∃intro) and (Q∽8) and thus x = k → x ≤ n by (aux).
Repeated use of ∨elim) then completes the proof of this direction.
To prove the converse direction set ϕn = x ≤ n → x = 0 ∨ x = 1 ∨ · · · ∨ x = n and we
prove ϕn by metainduction over n.
For the base case, x ≤ 0 → x = 0, we employ Claim 2. First note that 0 ≤ 0 → 0 = 0
follows from (weakening). Next, (Q∽1) gives us that 0 , S(u) and so by (∧elim) and
(cont), ¬(∃u)(A(z, y, u) ∧ 0 = S(u)) holds. By (Q∽5), it follows that ¬A(z, S(y), 0), and thus
(⊥elim), (trans), (∃elim), and (Q∽8) entail that S(y) ≤ 0 → S(y) = 0. So Claim 2 delivers
the desired result.
Next, observe that thanks to (∨intro) and (weakening)we have ϕn+1(0) and so if we prove
ϕn+1(S(y)) the claim follows using Claim 2.
(1) S(y) ≤ n + 1→ y ≤ n Claim 1
(2) S(y) ≤ n + 1→ y = 0 ∨ y = 1 ∨ . . . y = n IH, (2), and (trans)
(3) y = 0 ∨ y = 1 ∨ . . . y = n → S(y) = 0 ∨ S(y) = 1 ∨ . . . S(y) = n + 1
repeated use of (=prin), (∨elim), and (∨intro).
(4) ϕn+1(S(y)) (2), (3), and (trans)
(R∽5): Let us set ϕn = x ≤ n ∨ n ≤ x and we prove ϕn by metainduction over n. Clearly
from (Q∽4) and (Q∽8) we get that 0 ≤ x and so by (∨intro) we obtain both the base case
and also ϕn+1(0). Thus again proving ϕn+1(S(y)) completes the prof due to Claim 2.
(1) y ≤ n → S(y) ≤ n + 1 Claim 1
(2) n ≤ y → n + 1 ≤ S(y) Claim 1
(3) y ≤ n ∨ n ≤ y → S(y) ≤ n + 1 ∨ n + 1 ≤ S(y) (2), (3), (∨elim), and (∨intro)
(4) ϕn+1(S(y)) (3), IH, and (trans)
(R∽6): Thanks to (R∽4) we know that x ≤ n is equivalent to a disjunction of crisp
formulas and so it is crisp as a result of Proposition 5.13.. 
As before, it is obvious that the structureN can be interpreted as a model ofQ∽ in QSLw ,
henceQ∽ is consistent inQSLw . Therefore the previous theoremandCorollary 4.11., allows
us to prove the following theorem, which can indeed be seen as a generalisation of Hájek’s
result in first order BL.
Corollary 6.16. Q∽ is essentially undecidable in QSLw .
§7. Concluding remarks We have shown that the weak arithmetic theory R∽ is
essentially undecidable against the background of the weak propositional logicL0 extended
by minimal first-order axioms. The first upshot of this is that the cost of entry for essential
undecidability is very low indeed – one needs only a fairly weak arithmetic theory and
a fairly weak logic. Furthermore, we can show that R∽ is a weaker theory than even the
very weak Q∽ in the context of a slightly stronger (but still quite weak) logic. This extends
and strengthens Hájek’s result and suggests avenues of further investigation, perhaps using
Smullyan’s representation systems, into the limits of undecidability inmathematical theories
against the background provided by weak logics.
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